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INTRODUCTION
On October 20, 2017, Petitioner

filed a Verified Petition and

supporting exhibits that challenged the decision by Respondent Board of Parole denying her

administrative appeal. Respondent filed a Verified Answer (“Answer”) on December 6, 2017.1
respectfully submits this Reply Memorandum of Law in response to that Answer.
As described in detail below, the Answer fails to provide valid reasons or precedent to refute the

fundamental issues that render the Board’s January 2017 decision arbitrary and capricious.
First, Respondent incorrectly argues that the Board properly weighed the statutory

factors. See Ans. f *|62-79. As every statutory factor other than the underlying crime counsels
’ s release, the Board cannot plausibly explain how

probability” of recidivism. Further, Respondent improperly cites

—

poses a “reasonable

s re-entry

—

substance abuse COMPAS score 3 out of 10 as a reason warranting the Board’s denial.
However , the Board’s reliance on this score reflects an inaccurate reading of the COMPAS
Report.

Second, Respondent impermissibly contends that the Board’s questions about the crime
were lawful because it may consider the nature of the crime to be an “overriding consideration”
warranting denial. See Ans. f *1 80-85. In so arguing, Respondent ignores binding precedent

ruling that the severity of the offense may not be the sole rationale for a parole denial.

Third, Respondent inaccurately posits that the Board permissibly considered |
’ s pre-incarceration substance use. See Ans. 1[

86-88. However, prior substance use is

not a factor listed in the governing statute and considering this history contravenes the 2011

legislative amendment’s forward-looking focus. Indeed, stigmatizing substance abuse as if such
1

On November 16, 2017, the parties filed a stipulation providing that Respondent serve their Answer on or before
December 6, 2017 and Petitioner serve her Reply on or before January 8, 2018.

1
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an issue could not be ameliorated or administratively monitored upon release removes any
incentive for the many substance-dependent offenders to invest in their rehabilitation.
Fourth, Respondent improperly claims that the decision was non-conclusory . See Ans.

89-92 . The Board’s boilerplate written decision and transcript in context show otherwise. Its

^^

decision does not articulate any legitimate explanation of its rationale for denying
release and was therefore unlawfully conclusory and vague.
Finally, Respondent argues that the only relief available is a de novo hearing . See Ans.

193-94. While

initially requested a de novo hearing, Pet. Memo of Law 17, this

^

Court has recently held that release is the only appropriate remedy in parole cases, as ordering a

new parole hearing is “meaningless.” See Matter of Kellogg v. N. Y. State Bd of Parole, 2017
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 968 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty . 2017). Accordingly, this Court can and should order
release as an alternative remedy.
For all of the reasons stated in the Petition and Memorandum of Law, as well as those set

forth in this Reply Memorandum, the Court should grant |

’s

petition and order her

release or, in the alternative, order a de novo hearing within 30 days before new commissioners.

See Karen T. Ely v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, Index No. 100407/16, slip op. at * 15 (Sup . Ct.
N.Y. Cty. Jan. 20, 2017).
ARGUMENT

I. THE BOARD’S DECISION WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS BECAUSE THE
S DEMONSTRATED
BOARD FAILED TO FAIRLY CONSIDER I
REHABILITATION AND MINIMAL RISK OF RECIDIVISM.
Respondent argues that the Board properly weighed the relevant statutory factors and that

t
^
uncontested

its denial was therefore not unlawful, arbitrary, or capricious. Ans.

devotes eight paragraphs of its Answer to restating the

2
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judicial review of the Board’s decisions. See Ans. f f 62-68, 71 } Respondent then incorrectly

concludes that the “record reflects the Board considered the appropriate factors,” citing to “Exh.
B., generally.” See Ans. 72. However, a fair reading of the transcript fails to offer support and
this Court must intervene. See Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 41 N.Y.S.3d 490, 494
(1st Dep’t 2016) (“It is unquestionably the duty of the Board to give fair consideration to each of

the applicable statutory factors as to every person who comes before it, and where the record
convincingly demonstrates that the Board did in fact fail to consider the proper standards, the
courts must intervene.”) (internal citations omitted).

Precedent Respondent relies on reinforces rather than undermines the Board’s duty to
give genuine consideration to

s remorse, exemplary institutional record, non-violent

prior criminal history, favorable COMPAS scores, detailed release plans, and deportation order.

In each case cited, the court was satisfied that the Board adequately considered statutory factors
other than the underlying crime.3 See Ans. 11 62—71 .

2

Respondent states that the 2011 statutory amendments “do not change the legal standard governing the decisionmaking process of the Board .” See Ans. U 67. Although the overarching statutory framework remained consistent,
courts have found that the statutory amendments intended a material change in the law. As Morris v. New York
State Dep ' t of Corr , & Cmty . Supervision explained: “the statute replaced static, past focused guidelines with more
dynamic present and future-focused risk assessment procedures” and “intended a material change in the law.” 963
N.Y .S.2d 852, 855 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Cty. 2013) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, the court found that
“ the [respondents' assertions that the legislative amendment maintained the status quo ante must be rejected.” Id.
3
See Silmon v. Travis, 741 N.E .2d 501 (2000) (affirming that the Board may consider the petitioner’s remorse and
insight into the offense) ; Felder v. Travis , 717 N.Y.S.2d 683, 683 (3d Dep’t 2000) (also considering the petitioner’s
“ criminal history and his resistance to community standards”); Morales v. Travis, 687 N.Y.S.2d 495, 496 ( 3d Dep’t
1999) (also considering the petitioner's failure to accept responsibility or demonstrate remorse for the crime); Garcia
v . New York State Div. of Parole, 657 N .Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dep’t 1997) (also considering the petitioner’s prior
criminal history and noting that “[t] he record of the hearing demonstrates that the petitioner was given ample
opportunity to speak about his education and other significant accomplishments while in prison [and] his plans for
his release” ) (emphasis added); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 132-33 (1 st
Dep’t . 1983 ) ( also considering the petitioner’s prior history of violent behavior, violation of prior parole, and the
Board ’ s questions about “ her current performance and her plans for the future”). The additional precedent cited
restates the rule without clarifying whether the factors considered weighed in favor or against the petitioner’s
release. See Saunders v. Travis, 656 N.Y .S.2d 404 (3d Dep’t 1997) (not articulating whether factors other than the
petitioner’s institutional record and crime weighed in favor or against the petitioner); Angel v. Travis, 767 N.Y.S.2d
290 (3d Dep’t 2003) (not stating whether factors other than the crime weighed in favor or against the petitioner);
King v. Stanford. 137 A.D.3d 1396, 1397 (3d Dep’t. 2016) (same); Hanson v. New York State Bd. of Parole. 869
N.Y.S.2d 786 (2d Dep’t 2008) (not specifying any factors the Board considered); Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A .D.3d

3
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However, the record here establishes that the Board’s denial resulted from a failure to
give due consideration to any factor other than the offense. Rather than offering “ample
opportunity” to discuss her extraordinary rehabilitative accomplishments or comprehensive plans
to develop nutrition programs for children in Haiti, the Board asked

|two cursory

questions about her institutional accomplishments at the conclusion of the hearing and failed to
even address her plans after deportation. See Verified Pet. Exh. K, B-163 . The Board similarly

did not discuss any other statutory factor—other than the underlying offense—in detail 4 The

record offers no insight as to how the Board weighed this limited information in determining that
denial was warranted even though every other factor favored

s release. See Pet.

Memo of Law 7-12, 15-19.

The Board’s superficial review of the exceptional rehabilitation of parole candidates like

| was recently held unlawful. In Ruzas, Commissioner Cruise, one of|

s

hearing officers, was held in contempt of a court order requiring that the Board focus on the
petitioner’s rehabilitative efforts rather than “events of over 41 years ago,” when the offense
occurred. In the Matter of Ruzas v. New York State Div. of Parole, Index No. 1456/2016, at *4,
* 11 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty ., Oct. 18, 2017). There, the Court recognized the disconnect between

1413, 1414 ( 1 st Dep’t 2014 ) (same); LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole. 139 A.D.3d 1068, 1069 (2dDep’t
2016 ) (not explaining the petitioner’s prior criminal record or COMPAS scores); Mullins v. New York State Bd. of
Parole, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698, 699 (3 d Dep’t 2016) (not specifying the petitioner’s release plans or COMPAS scores).
Finally, Russo v . New York State Bd. of Parole, 405 N.E.2d 225 ( 1980), reviewed the Board’s decision fixing the
petitioner’s minimum prison period pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i( l )(a) (1999), rather than the Board’s
decision denying parole. At that time, the governing statute for minimum terms required the Board only to consider
the severity of the petitioner’ s crime and the petitioner’s prior criminal record. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i( l )(a)
( 1999 ) (repealed 2011). The current governing statute, N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i, revised that structure and is
inconsistent with the statute that governed Russo. N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i.
4
Other than questions about her crime and pre-incarceration history, the Board asked four questions about Ms.
' s Deportation Order (two of which questioned her knowledge about the penalty for illegal reentry), one
question confirming her last misbehavior report dating nine years earlier, one question inquiring into whether she
had “ a temper or something” during her early years of her incarceration, four questions about her relationship with
her cousin , one question about her mother’s current residence, one question about her education, and another about
her participation in one program . See Verified Pet., Ex. K, B-154, 155 , 159, 162, 163. Before the hearing concluded,
if there was anything they missed. Id. at B-164.
the Board asked

4
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the position Respondent contends was an appropriate review and what the Board actually did :

“Despite asserting that the Commissioners focused on all of the statutory factors, their words
stated at the hearing and used in their written decision reflect otherwise, as there was nothing
more than a fleeting reference to the other statutory factors in the decision and there was a dearth

of questions related to those factors at the hearing .” Id. at * 9. As it did during

's

hearing, the Board in Ruzas asked the petitioner only thirteen questions about other statutory

criteria: two questions about his COMPAS results and eleven questions about his behavior in

prison and release plans. Id.
This Court, as well as the First Department, have similarly found that a review focusing

on the underlying offense, while only summarily identifying the remaining statutory factors is
impermissible. Rossakis, 41 N.Y.S.3d at 494 (ordering a de novo hearing when the Board failed
to give “genuine consideration to petitioner's remorse, institutional achievements, release plan,

and her lack of any prior violent criminal history”); Pulinario v. New York State Dept , of
Corrections and Community Supervision, 988 N.Y.S.2d 525 *4 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Feb. 11, 2014)

(remanding for a de novo hearing when the Board placed “overwhelming emphasis” on the
offense and events leading up to it while making “passing references” to factors that favored

petitioner’s release); accord Rabenbauer v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty . Supervision,

995 N. Y.S.2d 490, 495 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cty. 2014) (overturning denial when the Board
“discussed other factors and Petitioner's achievements while in prison in a very perfunctory
manner, and in fact never discussed anything other than the instant offense in detail”). Indeed,
the Board denied

the meaningful review mandated by law and Respondent fails to

identify any evidence in the record that it did so. Accordingly, the Board’s denial was arbitrary

and capricious and must be remanded.

5
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Further, Respondent contends that the Board also had “before it” the Parole Board Report

See Ans. f 73 (emphasis added). Merely noting that materials were before the Board, however,

does not demonstrate that the Board fairly considered all materials. Coaxum v. New York State
Bd . of Parol. 827 N .Y.S.2d 489, 494 (Sup. Ct . Bronx Cty. 2006) (“[Ajctual consideration of

factors means more than acknowledging that evidence of them was before the Board .”).
Respondent additionally asserts that the Board’s failure to discuss each factor “does not
constitute convincing evidence that it did not consider them.” See Ans. 73. However, unlike the

^

5

cited cases, the record here clearly demonstrates that the Board failed to adequately consider the
proper factors and this Court must therefore intervene. Rossakis, 41 N .Y.S.3d at 494.

Respondent then articulates the uncontested rule that

s deportation order is

“one factor to consider .” See Ans. f 76. However, the cited case law does not undermine the
Board ’s duty to genuinely consider this factor,6 and the record here evidences that the Board did
not fulfill this mandate. See Pet. Memo of Law 10-11.

Respondent posits that the reasons articulated in the Board’s written decision for denying
parole are “sufficient grounds to support their decision,” referring to

s “record of

alcohol abuse including prior to the murder and burglary offenses, the probable risk for reentry
substance abuse in the COMPAS instrument, and that the offenses represent an escalation from

5

Davis v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 114 A . D.2d 412 ( 2 d Dep’t 1985) (also considering the petitioner’ s
persistent and serious prior offenses and that the petitioner committed the underlying offense while on parole for
only eight months and previously violated parole conditions). Mackall v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 458
N .Y .S.2d 251 (2d Dep’t. 1983) is also inapposite. There, the court reviewed the Board ’s decision setting the
petitioner’s minimum prison period pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 259- i ( l )( a) (1999), rather than the Board ’s
decision denying parole. The governing statute for minimum terms required the Board only to consider the severity
of the petitioner ’s crime and prior criminal record. See N .Y. Exec. Law 259- i ( l )( a) (1999 ) ( repealed 2011) . The
current governing statute, N.Y . Exec. Law § 259- i, revised that structure and is inconsistent with the statute that
governed Mackall . N .Y . Exec. Law § 259- i .
6
See Delrosario v. Stanford , 34 N.Y .S.3d 696 (3d Dep’t 2016) (“ [I]t appears from the record that the Board was
fully aware of [the petitioner’s] deportation status”); Samuel v. Alexander, 892 N.Y .S.2d 557 (2 d Dep’t 2010 ) (“The
Parole Board considered the statutory factors relevant to the petitioner's application to be released to parole,
including the fact that he was subject to a final order of deportation issued by a federal immigration judge.”)

6
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prior criminal behavior.” See Ans. Tf 74. The former two grounds, however, are impermissible,
rendering the severity of the offense the only valid consideration.7
s pre-incarceration alcohol use is not

First, as elaborated in Section III, infra,

a factor within the scope of the statute and the Board’s reliance on it was accordingly unlawful.
Matter of King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (N.Y. 1994) .
s “probable” COMPAS reentry substance

Second, the Board’s reliance on

abuse score—3 out of 10—reflects an improper reading and application of the COMPAS Report.
| may have

The Report, which the Board possessed during the hearing, provides that

a substance abuse problem and that substance abuse intervention upon release may be warranted.
See Verified Pet. Ex. H at B-077 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Report recommends three

times that further assessment be conducted to determine the proper treatment “upon release. ”8
The Report therefore establishes that denial of parole is not the anticipated outcome for

scoring “probable.” Rather, each recommendation is predicated on

petitioners like

the assumption that such petitioners will be released, with relapse prevention plans established if
needed.
The Board departed from precedent by not conducting such an assessment, and

Respondent offers no explanation for why this assessment was not conducted. See McBride v.

Evans, 988 N.Y.S.2d 523 at * 2 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. 2014) (noting that the COMPAS

7

The case law cited in Ans. 74 does not support Respondent’s position, as the Board there did not consider a
similar COMPAS score or the petitioner’s substance use prior to incarceration. Crawford v. New York State Bd. of
Parole, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dep’t 2016); Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132
(2d Dep’t 2012); Matter of Symmonds v. Dennison, 801 N.Y.S.2d 90 (3d Dep’t 2005); Matter of Garcia, 657
N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dep’t 1997). While Matter of McClain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d
Dep’t 1994) noted the petitioner’s “history of alcohol abuse,” it also considered his “pattern of offenses.”
8
First, the COMPAS Report provides that “[a] more in depth substance abuse assessment may also be prudent to
determine appropriate level of treatment.” Second, it states “[f ]or inmates scoring probable or highly probable it is
advisable to assess the extent of previous treatments, current attitudes for treatment, and the responsivity of the
inmate.” Third, it provides, “a more specialized substance abuse assessment inventory . . . may also be used to
determine the appropriate level of treatment upon release.” See Verified Pet. Ex. H at B 077.

^

-

-
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instrument indicated that the petitioner would need re-entry substance abuse treatment and
ordering a de novo hearing). Even without such assessment, the Board irrationally found Ms.
s score to be of such concern that it warranted parole denial rather than release

conditioned on a substance abuse program, as anticipated by the COMPAS instrument. See
Verified Pet. Ex. A.
s assertion that the Board should accurately interpret

Respondent argues that

and apply the COMPAS assessment is “without merit.” See Ans. 77. As support, Respondent
merely reiterates the uncontested rule that the COMPAS score in itself cannot mandate a

particular outcome. See Ans. 177. Respondent does not cite any case law that permits the Board
to justify a parole denial on a COMPAS score that Respondent conceded was low, Ans.

77. 9

Accordingly, the Board used the COMPAS instrument in a manner that thwarts the tool ’ s

mandate to assess rehabilitation and readiness for release . See N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-c(4); Diaz
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 976 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841 (Sup. Ct. Cayuga Cty . 2013) (“The

Board must, at the very least, review and consider the COMPAS results in order to fulfill the
statutory requirements of measur[ing] the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board

[and] the likelihood of success of such persons upon release . . . To hold otherwise would render
the statutory amendments meaningless.”).

—

9

The case law Respondent provides in Ans. 77 79 merely reiterates the rule that the COMPAS instrument is only
one factor to consider. Matter of King, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dep’t 2016) (noting that the Board considered the
COMPAS instrument); Montane v. Evans, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866 (3d Dep’t 2014) (same); Rivera v. New York State
Div. of Parole 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dep’t 2014) (same). Further, Garfield v. Evans, 968 N.Y.S.2d 262 (3d Dep’t
2013), found the Board’s failure to use the COMPAS instrument entitled the petitioner to a new hearing and
s argument that the Board must accurately utilize the COMPAS instrument in its
accordingly supports
decisions. Finally, Hawthorne v. Stanford is not relevant to the case at bar, as
does not contend that an
alternative COMPAS instrument should be administered. 22 N.Y.S.3d 640 (3d Dep’t. 2016) (reversing lower court’s
order that the Board prepare an alternative COMPAS Risk Assessment for inmates with mental illness).
Additionally, the cited authority predates the 2017 parole regulations. See 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a); Pet. Memo of
Law 3, 17.

.
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’s participation in countless substance abuse programs and twenty-seven

years of sobriety establish that she is a rehabilitated candidate whose prior substance abuse

history can be administratively monitored if necessary. See Verified Pet. ]f ]f 35—38. As |

( elaborated during the hearing:
I would like to say that I’m not the same person that I was about 28 years ago and I am
very, very, sorry for taking a life. I have done things to assure that I don’t live that type of
lifestyle. I have been going to AA also. My sobriety is very important to me. I have
positive friends and I have family that will help me, and also . . . I would like to live as a
positive citizen wherever I may go or whenever I’m released.”

—

See Verified Pet., Ex. K at B-164 65; see also Verified Pet . 119. The Board’s improper reliance
on her score of 3, without more, to deny parole is therefore irrational bordering on impropriety .

II. THE BOARD UNLAWFULLY FOCUSED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE UNDERLYING
CRIME.
Respondent asserts that the Board is statutorily required to consider the seriousness of the
crime and that the nature of the crime may be an “overriding consideration.” Ans. ff 81 , 83, 84.

While it is undisputed that the Board must consider the underlying crime and may weigh it more
heavily than other factors, it may not be the only consideration. Rossakis, 41 N.Y.S.3d at 494.
The authority Respondent relies on corroborates this: in each case, the courts noted factors other

than the underlying crime that also weighed against release . 10 The additional cases do not

articulate whether the other factors weighed in favor or against the petitioner’s release, and thus
do not suggest that the Board may base a denial on the underlying crime when all other factors

favor the petitioner.11 Finally, the foregoing cases predate the 2011 statutory amendments
10

Dudley v . Travis, 642 N .Y .S.2d 386, 387 (3d Dep’t 1996) (also considering the petitioner’ s lack of remorse and
mental health history); Hakim v . Travis, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dep ’ t 2003) (noting the petitioner committed the
offense while on probation); Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348, affd , 11 N.Y.3d 777 ( 1 st Dep’t 2008) (noting

the petitioner ’ s prior criminal history, that the record indicated that the petitioner may not have been forthcoming or
failed to accept responsibility for his offense, and that the petitioner provided unauthorized legal assistance while
working in the prison law library).
11
Sterling v. Dennison , 833 N . Y . S .2d 684 (3d Dep’t 2007) (finding that factors considered included the “petitioner's
negligible criminal history, his positive program accomplishments, his relatively clean prison disciplinary record and

9
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emphasizing the forward-looking nature of the Board’s review. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-c(4);

Pet. Memo of Law 12-13.
To the extent cited case law provides that the severity of the crime may be the sole

factor12 relied upon in a denial, this Court should not follow it. Binding precedent in the First

Department has unequivocally ruled that the underlying crime may not be the sole basis for
denial . Rossakis, 41 N. Y.S.3d at 494 (“The Board may not deny parole based solely on the
seriousness of the offense.”); Matter of King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 598 N.Y.S.2d

245, 251 (1 st Dep’t 1993) (“Since, however, the Legislature has determined that a murder
conviction per se should not preclude parole, there must be a showing of some aggravating
circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the crime itself.”).
Respondent further contends that, because the offense may be emphasized more than

other factors, the Board’s questions about the violent nature of the crime were lawful. Ans. f 85.
The precedent Respondent cites to, however, offers no specifics on the number or types of
questions the Board asked. See Pulliam v. Dennison, 832 N.Y.S.2d 304 (3d Dep’t 2007) (finding

“emphasis” placed on the crime does not establish irrationality); Sterling v. Dennison, 833
N. Y.S.2d 684 (3d Dep’t 2007) (noting the Board may place “greater emphasis” on the crime).
When the Board exhaustively discussed the underlying crime in detail, courts have

overturned their parole release denials. See, e.g., Rabenbauer v. New York State Dep’t of Corr.

his postrelease plans ”); Angel v . Travis, 767 N.Y .S.2d 290 (3 d Dep’ t 2003) (“ It is apparent from a review of the
record that the relevant statutory requirements were considered in this matter, with emphasis placed upon the violent
nature of petitioner's crime and his ‘ blatant disregard’ for human life”); Rodney v . Dennison , 805 N .Y.S.2d 743 (3d
Dep’ t 2005 ) (stating the Board considered “ petitioner's program and academic accomplishments, disciplinary record
and postrelease plans”); Pulliam v . Dennison, 832 N.Y.S.2d 304 (3d Dep’t 2007) (considering the petitioner’s “good
conduct, participation in prison programs, his institutional achievements and his plans upon release”).
12
Respondent wrongly asserts that the Board ’s decision considered
s escalating criminal history prior
to the underlying offense. See Ans . f 82 . However,
did not have any escalating criminal history prior to
the underlying offense; rather, she had a few non-violent misdemeanor convictions. This fact should weigh in favor
of her release, not against. See Pet. Memo of Law 9.

10
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& Cmty. Supervision. 995 N.Y.S.2d 490, 494 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cty. 2014) (overturning the

Board’s decision and granting a new hearing when two-thirds of the interview consisted solely of
discussion about the underlying offense); Hawkins v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty .
Supervision. 41 N.Y.S.3d 449 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cty. 2015), aff d as modified, N.Y.S.3d 397
(N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (ordering a new hearing when “the vast majority of the interview

consisted solely of discussion about the instant offense,” with questions seeking specific and
graphic details of the crime and answers about the petitioner’s mindset at the time); Ruzas, Index

No. 1456/2016, at *8, *9 (noting that the Board asked hypothetical questions relating to the
petitioner’s criminal case and finding that “a fair reading of the transcript and decision simply

reveal that the Commissioners chose to rely almost solely on Petitioner’s crucial past rather than
all of the [statutory and regulatory] criteria”).

In stark contrast to the lip service it paid to a few other statutory factors, the Board
poured over
questions

's

offense and prior criminal history with rigor. The majority of its

—nineteen out of thirty-three—focused on

’ s crime and

circumstances

prior to her incarceration. See Verified Pet. Ex. K. Further, as did the Board in Hawkins, the

Board here sought intimate details only about her offense. Pet. Memo of Law 18-19.
Moreover, similar to the Board’s questions in Ruzas, Index No. 1456/2016, at *8, *9, and

Hawkins, 41 N.Y.S.3d at *5, the Board here further impressed on

| its speculation

that she was angry at the time of the offense, inquiring multiple times as to what enraged her to
stab the victim. See Verified Pet., Ex. K, B-161. However, “[t]he role of the Parole Board is not
to resentence petitioner, according to the personal opinions of its members as to the appropriate

penalty for murder, but to determine whether, as of this moment, given all of the relevant

statutory factors, he should be released.” King, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 251 (emphasis added).

11
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|has repeatedly acknowledged,13 her offense resulted in an undoubtedly

tragic loss of human life. However,

|cannot change what she did, and the Legislature

has determined that “rehabilitation is possible and desirable even for the most serious of crimes.”
McBride v. Evans, 988 N.Y.S.2d 523 at *3 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. 2014). The Board
nonetheless focused exclusively on the underlying offense and its denial was thus arbitrary and
capricious.

in. THE BOARD’S DECISION WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS BECAUSE IT
CONSIDERED !
S PRE-INCARCERATION SUBSTANCE USE.
Respondent argues that history of drug and alcohol use are factors that may be considered

-

under N.Y. Exec. Law § 259 i(2)(c)(A). Ans.

86-88. However, Respondent ignores binding

precedent establishing that considering factors outside the scope of the applicable statute in
parole decisions is unlawful. See King, 83 N.Y.2d at 791 (affirming that the Board may not

consider factors outside the scope of the applicable statute).

-

pre incarceration substance abuse falls far outside of the scope ofN.Y.

Exec. Law § 259-i. The Supreme Court has established that “the starting point in interpreting a
statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the
contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” Consumer Product Safety

Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). A plain reading of the statute
reveals no mention of alcohol use prior to incarceration as a factor the Board should consider.

-

Further, the 2011 amendments strengthened the Board’s mandate to conduct a forward looking

assessment and focus on the applicant’s rehabilitation. Morris, 963 N.Y.S.2d at 855.

13

In her Personal Statement,
articulated: “I caused a lot of pain and I could not be more saddened by
it.. . [h]is family suffered a great deal and [sic] I cannot even imagine the pain and feelings of loss that they had to
live.” See Verified Pet., Ex. F at B-037; see also Verified Pet. 17-31 .

12
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The authority Respondent cites to support its proposition that pre-incarceration drug or
alcohol use on its own is a permissible statutory factor is distinguishable in that it involves
petitioners who had violated their parole conditions. 14 Ans. f 87. If consumption of substances

violated a parole condition, consideration of that conduct would have been lawful pursuant to

N.Y. Exec. Law § 259. See N .Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (mandating consideration of “prior
criminal record, including the nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous

probation or parole supervision and institutional confinement”) (emphasis added). In contrast,

Ms.

s alcohol consumption did not occur while under probation or community

supervision and thus there is no indication that her substance use could not be administratively

controlled. Accordingly ,

is more similar to Rossakis, where the First Department

overturned a denial based on the petitioner’s underlying crime, drug use history, and drug use
around the time of arrest. Rossakis, 41 N.Y.S.3d at 495.
The authority Respondent cites to support its proposition that

s 3 out of 10

COMPAS score for re-entry substance abuse was relevant given her consumption before the
offense is distinguishable for similar reasons. Respondent fails to point out that the petitioners in
those cases committed their current offenses while on probation. Ans. ]f 88.15

14

See Sanchez v. Dennison , 801 N . Y.S.2d 423, 424 (3d Dep’t 2005) (“The Board also noted petitioner's poor record
of compliance with community supervision”); Llull v. Travis, 731 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406 (3d Dep’t 2001 ) (basing the
decision , in part, on the petitioner's violation of prior parole conditions); Matter of Brant v. New York State Bd. of
Parole, 654 N .Y.S .2d 207 (3 d Dep’t. 1997) (noting that the petitioner was convicted of the underlying crime while
on parole and had four prior criminal convictions); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole. 468
N.Y .S.2d 881 , 884-85 ( 1 st Dep’t 1983) (considering the petitioner’s violation of a prior period of probation and
history of violent behavior). The other authority is also distinguishable in that it involves negative facts not present
here . See Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896, 897 (3d Dep’t 2017) (also considering the petitioner’s
criminal history , risk of future drug abuse, disciplinary history, and inconsistent sentencing minutes) (emphasis
added ); McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dep’t 1994) (also considering the
petitioner’s “ pattern of offenses”).
15
Matter of Bush v. Annucci , 50 N . Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dep’t. 2017) (considering the fact that the petitioner committed
the underlying crime while on probation as well as the petitioner’s recent disciplinary history, medium COMPAS
score for criminal involvement, and criminal history); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dep’t 2017)
(considering the fact that the petitioner violated her probation by using controlled substances and being hospitalized
for an overdose).

13
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This Court should follow King’s binding precedent and not read into N.Y. Exec. Law §
259-i a factor that is not in the statutory text and flouts legislative intent. See King, 83 N. Y.2d at

788. Rather than encouraging rehabilitation as “possible and desirable,” McBride, 988 N. Y.S.2d
at * 3, Respondent suggests that offenders who previously used substances may not be released

even if they take exceptional steps to rehabilitate. Such a message would have sweeping

implications because approximately half of all inmates meet DSM-IV criteria for substance

abuse or dependence and significant percentages of prisoners committed the act they are
incarcerated for while under the influence of drugs. See INCARCERATION, SUBSTANCE ABUSE,
AND ADDICTION , THE CENTER FOR PRISONER HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS,

http://www.prisonerhealth.org/educational-resources/factsheets-2/incarceration-substance-abuse-

and-addiction/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2018). The Board acted impermissibly in denying Ms.
when it considered her substance use prior to the offense and its decision should thus be
overturned.
IV. THE BOARD’S DECISION VIOLATED LAWFUL PROCEDURE BECAUSE IT
FAILED TO EXPLAIN ITS DENIAL IN DETAILED OR NON- CONCLUSORY TERMS.

Respondent claims the Board articulated a legitimate explanation of its rationale for
denying release in its written determination, as required by N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).
Ans. TH1 89-92.

Respondent first argues that the Board is not required to state what a petitioner should do
to improve her changes for parole in the future. Ans. 90. Respondent, however, not only cites
to cases outside this jurisdiction, but also to cases that are inapposite. Ans. ]j 90.16

16

Matter of Francis v. New York State Div . of Parole, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3 d Dep’t . 2011) (considering the
petitioner’s violent prior criminal history); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 800 N .Y.S.2d 797
(3 d Dep’t 2005) (considering a petitioner with a clean disciplinary record spanning only five years) ; Matter of Partee
v. Evans, 969 N .Y.S.2d 733, 735 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cty. 2013), aff d, 984 N.Y .S.2d 894 (2014) (reviewing a
petitioner with a violent history and disciplinary history that included a tier three disciplinary ticket issued a few

14
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Significantly, Respondent failed to address precedent decided by this Court suggesting
that the Board should offer petitioners such guidance. See Cappiello v. New York State Bd. of

Parole. 800 N.Y.S. 2d 343 at *6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 2004); Pet. Memo of Law 22.17 This is
particularly true when every factor other than the nature of the crime weighs in petitioner’s favor.

See Rios v. New York State Div. of Parole, 836 N. Y.S.2d 503 at *4 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty . 2007);

Pet. Memo of Law 22.
Respondent further contends that whether the written decision is defectively conclusory
must be considered in light of the hearing transcript. Ans. 191. Respondent cites to two cases

that provide no detail on how the hearing transcript belied the written decision, but merely recite

this broad rule. See Matter of Jackson v. Evans, 987 N.Y.S.2d 422 (2d Dep’t 2014); Matter of
Kozlowski v. N.Y.S. Bd . of Parole, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1 st Dep’t 2013). Other cases are equally
unhelpful as they point to negative factors in the record that supported the Board’s decision but
that are not part of Ms.

s record. 18 Even if the hearing transcript is to be considered, the

hearing transcript substantiates that the Board did not adequately consider the required factors.

See Pet. Memo of Law 18-19.
Finally , Respondent contends that courts have found similar decisions not conclusory.
Ans. 92. However, the

decision is not similar to the cited cases.19 Rather, courts have

weeks prior to the hearing and two tier two tickets in the four years prior). Further, these cases were decided before
the 2017 regulations were promulgated . See 9 N.Y .C.R.R. § 8002.2(a); Pet. Memo of Law 3, 22.
17
Accord McBride v. Evans, 988 N.Y .S.2d 523 at *3 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. 2014) (“Having advised petitioner that
he has done all he could to do rehabilitate himself and then having denied him parole, the Board leaves petitioner
with no guidance as to what he can do to improve his chances of release at his next parole release hearing.”);
Coaxum v. New York State Bd . of Parole, 827 N.Y.S.2d 489, 497 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (“The Board has not made even a
fleeting reference to why or how petitioner will be more ready in the fiiture”).
18
See Wiley V. State Dep’t of Corrections and Community Supervision, 2015 WL 10892033 (N.Y. Sup. 2015)
( noting the petitioner had a violent criminal history with felonies and failed at prior community supervision); In re
Hyman v. New York State Dep’t of Parole, 2014 WL 1333969 (N.Y . Sup 2014) (noting the petitioner used illegal
drugs while incarcerated ).
19
These cases either rely on negative factors that are not part of the I
record, see Miller v. New York State
Div. of Parole, 897 N .Y .S.2d 726 (2d Dep’t 2010) (considering the petitioner’s criminal history and continued claim
of innocence) ; Smith v. New York State Div. of Parole, 916 N .Y.S.2d 285 (3d Dep’t 2011 ) (considering the

15

21 of 23

FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/08/2018 04:35 PM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 22

INDEX NO.
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/08/2018
FUSL000124

found prior similarly worded denials to be conclusory. See Rossakis, 41 N. Y. S . 3 d at 495 (“The
Board summarily listed petitioner's institutional achievements, and then denied parole with no
further analysis of them . . . [Further, some] statements came directly from the language

of Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c).”); Rios v. New York State Div. of Parole, 836 N.Y.S.2d 503
(Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. 2007) (“[t]he passing mention in the Parole Board's decision of petitioner's

rehabilitative achievements cannot serve to demonstrate that the Parole Board weighed or fairly
considered the statutory factors”); see also Pet. Memo of Law 21—22.

The Board's mere reiteration of the often recited statutory language offers no specific
explanation as to why

|poses a danger to society. Its decision was thus arbitrary and

capricious and must be overturned.

petitioner’s “extensive” disciplinary record), or restate the rule without clarifying what level of detail is sufficient to
render a decision non-conclusory, Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87, 88 (1 st Dep’t
2013); Matter of Zhang v. Travis, 782 N.Y.S.2d 156 (3d Dep’t 2004) (merely noting the petitioner’s “disciplinary
record”).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein and in the Petition and Memorandum of Law, this Court

should grant the petition, vacate the Board’s decision, and order that

be released or

grant a de novo hearing before different commissioners within 30 days.

Dated:

New York, NY

January 8, 2018
Respectfully submitted,

BRETT DIGNAM, Esq .
Counsel for petitioner,
Morningside Heights Legal Services, Inc.
Columbia Law School
435 West 116th Street, Room 831
New York, NY 10027
Tel: 212-854-4291
Fax: 212-854-3554
bdigna@law.columbia.edu
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